How do Liverpool’s title-winning teams of Klopp and Slot compare?

Football writer Alex Keble compares Liverpool's two table-topping triumphs in the Premier League era.

For some, Liverpool’s first Premier League title in five years looks similar to the last one: champions-elect for what felt like months and cantering over the line as the undisputed best team in the country.

To Liverpool supporters, it will feel completely different. The first was won in empty stadiums and celebrated in the isolation of lockdown. This time, the players and fans were able to celebrate together inside Anfield on the day the crown was clinched.

But celebrations aside, there are arguably as many similarities between Jurgen Klopp’s 2019/20 champions and Arne Slot’s 2024/25 title-winners as there are differences.

Nine members of the 2019/20 squad are still at the club, with five – that’s half the outfield team – being key players both then and now: Alisson, Trent Alexander-Arnold, Andrew Robertson, Virgil van Dijk and Mohamed Salah. 

However, on the top-line stats, this year doesn’t quite match up.

How Klopp and Slot's champions compare

Slot’s Liverpool will finish the season with at least five points fewer than the class of 2019/20, and even if they win all of their remaining fixtures, they cannot match Klopp’s 32 victories in 2019/20.

But there’s more to it than the headline figures. Here, we take a look at how the two teams compare.

Slot’s team aren’t as hard-pressing, creating a calmer team

The main difference often cited between Klopp and Slot is the latter’s calmer control. The football is slower than Klopp’s manic attacking, with a greater emphasis on resting in possession and managing the game state.

This is certainly true, but not necessarily in the way people might think.

Off the ball, Slot's Liverpool do not press as high or as hard, while they also record fewer defensive actions, a marked shift in each of the following categories.

How Klopp and Slot's champions compare for defensive actions

The number of pressed sequences being down by a third, and the recoveries down by a quarter, is quite something. 

But for an even clearer example, look at Liverpool’s possession-winning lines against Manchester City at the Etihad Stadium.

When Liverpool lost 4-0 at the Etihad in 2019, they held 53 per cent possession, with a line at 35 metres, whereas in a 2-0 win this season they had 34 per cent possession with a 21-metre line.

Liverpool possession-winning lines v Man City (A) 2019/20

Liverpool possession-winning lines v Man City (A) 2024/25

By hounding the ball less, Liverpool now stay in a more compact shape, making them less vulnerable to breaks.

Of course, Klopp’s team of 2019/20 were also superb at preventing counter-attacks - by pressing so perfectly, they suffocated the opponent entirely.

But by 2023/24 this approach had led to a more wayward and open style. Slot’s more conservative football is a response to this final incarnation.

However, Slot’s team are more progressive – and looser – in attack

That classic Klopp team was all about a functional, workmanlike midfield three who did all the running and pressed hard, complimented by a narrow three-pronged attack of fire and fury.

By contrast, Slot’s team are more flexible, elegant, and creative in midfield – and in this respect they run counter to the supposed idea of being a calmer, more conservative team.

Alexis Mac Allister, Ryan Gravenberch, and Dominik Szoboszlai are more sophisticated in possession, more open to positional switches, and more likely to attempt the riskier line-splitting pass than any of Fabinho, Jordan Henderson, or Georginio Wijnaldum from the 2019/20 team.

Combined, the three main midfielders of 2019/20 created 60 chances from open play in the Premier League.

This season, the three main midfielders have already created 100 between them, after 34 matches.

The knock-on effect appears to be that Liverpool aren’t as possession-dominant now as they once were, while they are more comfortable launching fast breaks.

That goes against how Klopp’s side are remembered.

How Klopp and Slot's sides compare on possession and fast breaks

So, while Slot’s Liverpool have eased off in the press, they have actually dialled up the creativity and urgency in midfield.

Peak Salah makes Slot’s team better goalscorers – but overly reliant on their star

Linked to that more creative midfield three, Slot’s side have a slightly better output on a number of goalscoring and chance-creation measures.

Liverpool goals and big chances per 90 minutes compared

Salah’s record-breaking season is surely the reason why. He was brilliant in 2019/20, too, scoring 19 goals and assisting 10, but that simply cannot compare to this year.

Salah goals & assists compared

Notice that final column: Salah’s goals and assists have contributed a whopping 57.5 per cent of Liverpool’s Premier League goals this season, whereas despite being the team’s biggest contributor in 2019/20 he only accounts for 34.1 per cent .

This has arguably left Liverpool more vulnerable, since any drop-off from Salah – as we have seen over the last couple of months – leads to a downturn in results.

Over-reliance on Salah is something Slot might want to address in the summer. 

He will be happy to have a more creative midfield, and to be less manic in the press, but he would no doubt love a player like Sadio Mane (18 goals and seven assists in 2019/20) to compliment Salah.

Difference in full-back usage perhaps explains it all

Liverpool in 2024/25 are more creative in central midfield than they used to be, more controlled in how they defend, but overly-reliant on Salah’s output.

All three of these differences can perhaps be explained by how the two managers use their full-backs.

In 2019/20, Robertson (12) and Alexander-Arnold (13) ended with 25 Premier League assists between them. This year that total is just seven, all coming from the latter.

Alexander-Arnold & Robertson goal involvements compared

This is partly to do with Robertson’s level declining with age, but also because Slot preaches greater conservatism compared to the way Klopp made flying full-backs integral to his tactics.

Liverpool of old would deploy very narrow forwards, sucking the opposition defence inwards, thus freeing space for the full-backs to get on the ball in dangerous positions.

By contrast, Slot predominantly expects his wingers to hold the width, with Alexander-Arnold and Robertson coming infield slightly (or staying deep) to block against potential counters and help control central midfield.

These two ‘average position’ graphics, taken from home games against Chelsea, show the difference in their positioning. In 2019/20, Alexander-Arnold (66) and Robertson (26) both got an assist, whereas neither did in the equivalent fixture in 2024/25.

Liverpool average positions v Chelsea (H) 2019/20

Liverpool average positions v Chelsea (H) 2024/25

That extra control in the middle has come in handy, although losing attacking full-backs does illuminate why Salah’s creativity and goalscoring is of extra importance these days.

Slot and Klopp sides fairly similar – and both impressive in their own way

Ultimately we should not overstate the differences. 

With so many of the same players at the core, and with Slot merely tweaking a formula already in the muscle memory of the squad at his disposal, many of their characteristics are the same.

But comparing the scale of the achievement, Klopp edges it.

Klopp built the team from scratch, taking over a side that had finished sixth with 62 points in 2014/15 and winning Liverpool their first league title in 30 years.

Slot, then, had a much easier task in continuing the project, although he is only the fifth manager in Premier League history to win the competition in his debut year, after Jose Mourinho, Carlo Ancelotti, Manuel Pellegrini, and Antonio Conte.

What’s more, Slot is perhaps a victim of his own success. By winning the title he’s made it look as though only small changes were required to keep the Klopp train running.

But rewind to last summer and many feared Slot’s inexperience, feared the scale of the rebuild given Liverpool’s ageing squad, and feared that Klopp’s stature would create a similar situation to when Sir Alex Ferguson left Manchester United.

We should not play down his achievements or rewrite the narrative retrospectively. Slot has made it look easy.  It hasn’t been.

Like Klopp, he is now a Liverpool great, forever remembered as the manager who drew the club level with Man Utd on 20 league titles. 

And he did it, for the most part, his own way.

Read more about Liverpool's title triumph