Since joining the club as head coach in late November, Ruben Amorim has consistently spoken about his desire to create a clear identity for his Manchester United side.
Two months and 15 matches in - a run that has featured seven defeats - the 39-year-old is yet to forge that distinctive and successful style he craves.
Reacting to Man Utd's humbling 3-1 loss at home to Brighton & Hove Albion on Sunday, a frustrated Amorim admitted "it's clear" it will take a while to change things for the better.
"I'm not going to change the way I see the game, I'm very clear on that," he said.
"The players are going to suffer. I'm really sorry, the fans are going to suffer. I have one way of doing things.
"But we need to survive this moment. We are being the worst team maybe in the history of Manchester United.”
These were very strong words from Amorim, which begs the question, what exactly is the identity he is so determined to develop at Old Trafford?
How does Amorim want Man Utd to play?
During his time with Sporting CP, usually in a 3-4-2-1 formation, he developed a brand of aggressive, purposeful football, with and without the ball.
In possession, Amorim wants to stretch the pitch out by stationing his wing-backs high and wide, creating room on the inside for his midfielders to play through the thirds in half-space pockets created by clever movement.
The positioning of his players is often aimed at creating 5v4 overloads when playing out from the back, and their first goal in a 3-2 loss against Nottingham Forest is a terrific example of what he is looking to achieve.
This screenshot below clearly shows the shape, and how they want to make a 5v4 in deeper areas, before playing through the lines.
Look how high and wide the wing-backs are, creating lots of space for the twin attacking midfielders, who also start in advanced areas.
In this example, Bruno Fernandes drops in to show for a pass from Matthijs de Ligt, and his one-touch pass inside to Manuel Ugarte opens up the pitch completely.
After creating and exploiting the space, Ugarte found Alejandro Garnacho, using Rasmus Hojlund’s decoy run to create space, and from a rebound, the latter scored.
From all their performances so far, this goal is the best illustration of what Amorim is trying to achieve.
The shape and movement in this pattern of play had his fingerprints all over it.
Out of possession, Amorim wants solidity in a 5-4-1 block when pushed back – and this has largely functioned very well against stronger sides such as Liverpool, Arsenal and Manchester City.
Amorim also wants to see high-intensity pressing, and they have enjoyed some success with it.
When Man Utd's striker chose the right moment to sprint towards Southampton and Brighton’s goalkeepers in their last two outings, team-mates worked hard to squeeze up from behind.
As you can see below, their positioning and man-to-man set-up limited the passing options for both 'keepers, and they scored goals on both occasions, albeit by forcing a penalty against the Seagulls.
The challenge now is to produce pressing of this quality more often, and to be brave enough to do it against the division’s stronger sides.
Centre-back pressing can pay off - or cost goals
Amorim’s use of a back three is also supposed to be a proactive tactic, rather than a defensive ploy.
He wants one of his spare central defenders to be aggressive and to step into midfield when opposition forwards drop off to show for a pass.
It worked very well when Lisandro Martinez regained the ball in an advanced area at Anfield, after following his man into Liverpool's half.
Martinez's goal v Liverpool
Unreal finish, unreal passion 🇦🇷
— Manchester United (@ManUtd) January 6, 2025
🤳 @Snapdragon#MUFC || #ShotOnSnapdragon pic.twitter.com/gFQWZkMBfp
However, this ploy has also cost United goals, with their centre-backs not always making the right decisions about when to step in.
Not yet in synch, with more work on the training ground required, Amorim knows they must improve in this department.
A recent example of this tactic going wrong occurred last time out against Brighton.
De Ligt (below) made a move to follow Danny Welbeck into midfield, but there was not enough pressure on the ball when Carlos Baleba had it at his feet.
Seeing that De Ligt had advanced, Baleba clipped a terrific long ball into the space vacated, for Kaoru Mitoma, who ran in beyond Noussair Mazraoui.
From this attack, the visitors scored.
Amorim’s Sporting side were superb at congesting space, knowing when to step into midfield to create turnovers, but United’s defenders are yet to fully get to grips with it.
Fewer presses and turnovers under Amorim
Amorim has now managed Man Utd in 11 Premier League matches - the same number Erik ten Hag, was in charge for at the beginning of the season.
While they are breaking up play a bit quicker than they did under Ten Hag, ranking fourth for PPDA (passes per defensive action), some of their other off-the-ball numbers are disappointing.
United have dropped from third in the rankings for high turnovers to 14th under Amorim, and they have also made less pressed sequences.
The positive spin is that more of their high turnovers have led to chances.
How Man Utd compare under Amorim v Ten Hag - 11 matches each
Premier League 24/25 | Ten Hag | PL Rank | Amorim | PL Rank |
High turnovers | 99 | =3rd | 72 | =14th |
---|---|---|---|---|
Shot-ending high turnovers | 13 | 13th | 13 | =9th |
Pressed sequences | 155 | 4th | 124 | 10th |
PPDA | 11.9 | =11th | 11.0 | 4th |
What does Amorim want from his players on the ball?
During Amorim's hugely successful period in charge of Sporting, his players were famed for being able to control matches with quality possession AND break on opponents with speed and penetration equally well.
They had different ways of hurting teams, seamlessly switching between those styles depending on the match state.
The change of formation has certainly impacted the players at Man Utd, with most individuals within his starting XI asked to perform different roles.
The inclusion of an additional central defender, full-backs turned into wing-backs, wide forwards asked to tuck inside, and Fernandes asked to take up new positions, are just some of the alterations.
The below maps of United's average passing networks this season illustrate the changes; the one on the left is for the first 11 matches under Ten Hag and the right-hand one reflects the 11 matches since Amorim took charge.
Man Utd average passing networks 24/25 - left: under Ten Hag, right: Amorim
In fairness to Amorim, his side has got better at playing out from the back since he took the helm.
Before his arrival, there was no discernible strategy in place for goal kicks, other than a heavy emphasis on building down the left side.
United also lost possession (red circles) in bad areas more frequently in the 11 matches under Ten Hag than they have done in the last 11 matches with Amorim in charge.
Amorim has a more varied style from goal kicks, and tellingly, he likes to bounce passes into midfielders (or a centre-back that steps out) in central areas in order to move the ball upfield.
We did not see this previously, as shown below; again, the left side shows Ten Hag's 11 matches, with Amorim's on the right.
Man Utd goal kicks 24/25 - left: under Ten Hag, right: Amorim
Are Man Utd now a possession-based side?
Man Utd have enjoyed most of the possession in seven of their 11 Premier League matches under Amorim.
He wants them to control matches, and to produce fast, well-constructed patterns of play inside the opposition half - but they lost four of those seven fixtures.
All of those defeats were at home, against Nottingham Forest, AFC Bournemouth, Newcastle United and Brighton.
Why do they struggle?
You could argue Amorim's line-up contains too many defensive players, with the back five usually comprising of centre-backs and full-backs, and one or both central midfielders also best known for their off-the-ball work.
Using just three natural attackers has arguably hindered their creativity, although Amad and Fernandes have made excellent contributions.
When you look at the data, you can see that United’s direct speed on the counter attack and ability to hurt opponents on the break has diminished under Amorim.
How Man Utd's direct attacks compare under Amorim v Ten Hag - 11 matches each
Premier League 24/25 | Ten Hag | PL Rank | Amorim | PL Rank |
Build-up attacks | 34 | 6th | 33 | =6th |
---|---|---|---|---|
Direct attacks | 23 | =5th | 17 | 13th |
10+ pass OP sequences* | 136 | 7th | 161 | 4th |
Direct speed (m/s) | 1.87 | =4th | 1.54 | 18th |
*OP = open play
He wants to be able to create chances through control AND via fast, vertical transitions, but with an 8/3 or 7/4 split on defensive/attacking players in place, that has been problematic.
Moving forward, Amorim will need to add more speed, athleticism and attacking panache into his line-up to correct the imbalance.
Searching for the right balance
Making the pitch big in possession by stretching play is a fine tactical principle, but Man Utd’s current players are not especially suited to it.
Maybe lacking a little confidence, through poor results and changes of position, they have not found a cohesive flow.
When possession has been squandered, Amorim’s side have then looked vulnerable to conceding.
It is no coincidence that a side containing three centre-backs, two full-backs and a double-pivot midfield has excelled most in matches where they were content to sit back into a 5-4-1 shape.
Their draw at Liverpool and penalty shootout win at Arsenal in the FA Cup were impressive, and they also beat Manchester City playing a similar way at the Etihad Stadium.
Right now, Amorim has the personnel to handle that type of challenge.
But to fully implement his philosophy and achieve success with it, the Man Utd boss will need a greater number of players with suitable profiles.
What does Amorim do in the meantime?
Amorim insists Man Utd must ‘suffer’ before it all clicks into place, and that is true, but damaging results also have to be kept to a minimum.
Until he has the squad to play in his chosen identity, in the manner he craves, finding a tactical compromise that makes them more comfortable feels essential for short-term stability.